Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models

Nicholas Carlini, Florian Tramer, Eric Wallace, Matthew Jagielski, Ariel Herbert-Voss, Katherine Lee, Adam Roberts, Tom Brown, Dawn Song, Ulfar Erlingsson, Alina Oprea, Colin Raffel

Presenter: Tom Tian, Kabir Ahuja

Feb 21, 2024

Background

- Previous work assumes way much more about what we can access for attacking

Knowledge	Supervised	The attacker has a data set D', which contains a subset of the target set D, as well as some data points from the same underlying distribution as D that are not in D. The attacker trains an inference model h in a supervised manner, by minimizing the empirical loss function $\sum_{d \in D'} (1 - \mathbb{1}_{d \in D}) h(d) + \mathbb{1}_{d \in D}(1 - h(d))$, where the inference model h computes the membership probability of any data point d in the training set of a given target model f, i.e., $h(d) = \Pr(d \in D; f)$. 
	Unsupervised	The attacker has data points that are sampled from the same underlying distribution as D'. However, he does not have information about whether a data sample has been in the target set D.

- The attacker holds the training set or some data sample points from the same underlying distribution
- Try to capture the gradient in training assuming the model uses SGD algorithm

Nasr et al. (2019)

Background



Fig. 2: Training shadow models using the same machine learning platform as was used to train the target model. The training datasets of the target and shadow models have the same format but are disjoint. The training datasets of the shadow models may overlap. All models' internal parameters are trained independently.

- Use so-called **shadow models** to simulate the behavior of our target model, which assumes **known** (or partially known) **architecture** of target model
- By nature it's on classification task instead of regression

Shokri et al. (2017)

Background

- LLM are **overparameterized**, so they have the ability to store all the training data
- Can we **extract the training data** from black box access to a specific LLM?
- Although GPT-2 is open source, this paper only assumes **black-box access** to GPT-2
- The training set of GPT-2 only contains dataset publicly available (source of training set is publicized)



- Generate many samples from GPT-2 when the model is conditioned on (potentially empty) prefixes
- Sort each generation according to one of six metrics and remove the duplicates
- Manually inspect 100 of the top-1000 generations for each metric
- Mark each generation as either memorized or not-memorized by manually searching online
- Confirm these findings by querying the original training data

Main content

- Top-n: Low diversity; repeated

- Temperature; Internet

- Sorting: Perplexity, Small, Medium, zlib, Lowercase, Window



Figure 1: **Our extraction attack.** Given query access to a neural network language model, we extract an individual person's name, email address, phone number, fax number, and physical address. The example in this figure shows information that is all accurate so we redact it to protect privacy.

Inference Strategy	**Text Generation Strategy**		
	Top-*n*	**Temperature**	**Internet**
Perplexity	9	3	39
Small	41	42	58
Medium	38	33	45
zlib	59	46	67
Window	33	28	58
Lowercase	53	22	60
Total Unique	191	140	273

Table 2: The number of memorized examples (out of 100 candidates) that we identify using each of the three text generation strategies and six membership inference techniques. Some samples are found by multiple strategies; we identify 604 unique memorized examples in total.

- Among the 1800 data samples, a total of 604 data samples are actual training samples, with a total true positive rate of 33.5%
- The optimal attack strategy had a true positive rate of 67%

Category	Count
US and international news	109
Log files and error reports	79
License, terms of use, copyright notices	54
Lists of named items (games, countries, etc.)	54
Forum or Wiki entry	53
Valid URLs	50
Named individuals (non-news samples only)	46
Promotional content (products, subscriptions, etc.)	45
High entropy (UUIDs, base64 data)	35
Contact info (address, email, phone, twitter, etc.)	32
Code	31
Configuration files	30
Religious texts	25
Pseudonyms	15
Donald Trump tweets and quotes	12
Web forms (menu items, instructions, etc.)	11
Tech news	11
Lists of numbers (dates, sequences, etc.)	10

Table 1: Manual categorization of the 604 memorized training examples that we extract from GPT-2, along with a description of each category. Some samples correspond to multiple categories (e.g., a URL may contain base-64 data). Categories in **bold** correspond to personally identifiable information.



Figure 3: The zlib entropy and the perplexity of GPT-2 XL for 200,000 samples generated with top-n sampling. In red, we show the 100 samples that were selected for manual inspection. In blue, we show the 59 samples that were confirmed as memorized text. Additional plots for other text generation and detection strategies are in Figure 4.

- Among the successfully extracted training data, 46 samples contained personal names (non-celebrities) and 32 contained some form of contact information

Result

Memorized String	Sequence Length	Occurrences in Data	
		Docs	Total
Y2...[redacted]...y5	87	1	10
7C...[redacted]...18	40	1	22
XM...[redacted]...WA	54	1	36
ab...[redacted]...2c	64	1	49
ff...[redacted]...af	32	1	64
C7...[redacted]...ow	43	1	83
0x...[redacted]...C0	10	1	96
76...[redacted]...84	17	1	122
a7...[redacted]...4b	40	1	311

Table 3: **Examples of $k = 1$ eidetic memorized, high-entropy content that we extract** from the training data. Each is contained in *just one* document. In the best case, we extract a 87-characters-long sequence that is contained in the training dataset just 10 times in total, all in the same document.

- Larger LM can memorize more training data
- Even if some data samples only exist in one document in the training data set, they can be memorized by the LM (**k = 1 eidetic memorized**)
- For the largest GPT-2, some samples only need to appear **33 times for memorization**
- For LLM, any potentially sensitive information that is repeated many times has the risk of being memorized

Result

URL (trimmed)	Occurrences		Memorized?		
	Docs	Total	XL	M	S
/r/[redacted]51y/milo_evacua...	1	359	✓	✓	½
/r/[redacted]zin/hi_my_name...	1	113	✓	✓	
/r/[redacted]7ne/for_all_yo...	1	76	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]5mj/fake_news_...	1	72	✓		
/r/[redacted]5wn/reddit_admi...	1	64	✓	✓	
/r/[redacted]lp8/26_evening...	1	56	✓	✓	
/r/[redacted]jla/so_pizzagat...	1	51	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]ubf/late_night...	1	51	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]eta/make_christ...	1	35	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]6ev/its_officia...	1	33	✓		
/r/[redacted]3c7/scott_adams...	1	17			
/r/[redacted]k2o/because_his...	1	17			
/r/[redacted]tu3/armynavy_ga...	1	8			

- ✓ if the corresponding URL was generated **verbatim** in the first 10,000 generations.
- ½ If the URL was generated by feeding GPT-2 the first 6 characters of the URL and then running a **beam search**
- This also reflects why small and medium selection metric is useful

Contribution and what's missing

- A simple and effective method to extract verbatim sequences from a LM's training set using **only black-box query access** (Although they admit that using training data will cause more training data regurgitation)
- Extensive experiments were conducted on GPT-2
- Discussed a number of strategies to mitigate privacy leakages: **differential privacy** can **guarantee privacy** within a certain scope of application, but it results in **longer training time** and generally **reduces performance**.
- Didn't talk about on why what the paper did can generate training samples
- Why the last two data sampling strategies in the paper can increase the variation of text?
- I would expect some fancier method for extracting data

Does memorization happens on CV tasks?

Does memorization happens on production-level NLP models?

Extracting Training Data from Diffusion Models

Nicholas Carlini, Jamie Hayes, Milad Nasr, Matthew Jagielski, Vikash Sehwag, Florian Tramèr, Borja Balle, Daphne Ippolito, Eric Wallace

Training Set | **Generated Image**

Caption: Living in the light with Ann Graham Lotz

Prompt: Ann Graham Lotz

Figure 1: Diffusion models memorize individual training examples and generate them at test time. **Left:** an image from Stable Diffusion's training set (licensed CC BY-SA 3.0, see [49]). **Right:** a Stable Diffusion generation when prompted with "Ann Graham Lotz". The reconstruction is nearly identical (ℓ_2 distance = 0.031).

- A generative image model (such as Stable Diffusion) trained on a dataset that happens to contain a photo of this person will **regenerate an almost identical image** when asked to generate an image of that person's name as input

Architecture		Images Extracted	FID
GANs	StyleGAN-ADA [43]	**150**	**2.9**
	DiffBigGAN [82]	57	4.6
	E2GAN [69]	95	11.3
	NDA [63]	70	12.6
	WGAN-ALP [68]	49	13.0
DDPMs	OpenAI-DDPM [52]	**301**	**2.9**
	DDPM [33]	232	3.2

Table 1: The number of training images that we extract from different off-the-shelf pretrained generative models out of 1 million unconditional generations. We show GAN models sorted by FID (lower is better) on the top and diffusion models on the bottom. Overall, we find that diffusion models memorize more than GAN models. Moreover, better generative models (lower FID) tend to memorize more data.

- **Diffusion model** is based on variational inference, which optimizes the likelihood function and has a **tendency to memorize data**.
- Compared to GANs, **diffusion models remember more images in the data when generating at the same quality**. Especially when there are many identical images in the data set, the diffusion model makes it easier to remember the data.

Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Models

Milad Nasr, Nicholas Carlini, Jonathan Hayase, Matthew Jagielski, A. Feder Cooper, Daphne Ippolito, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Eric Wallace, Florian Tramèr, Katherine Lee

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company company company company company company company company is based in the state of Ohio within the US, we have worked with clients all over the US, as well as Europe and Australia. We do some things here as well, and try to share the best. Please note that the information provided is not legal advice. Everything we tell you is our own perspective on the law, based on the facts you give us.
If you have a legal problem, you should hire an attorney to help you. We're just here to provide information and educate.
Lastly, we very much appreciate your donations and your support.
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Please consult a lawyer and seek legal advice in your state to ensure accuracy. Do not take any actions or fail to take action based on this content. We expressly disclaim all liability in respect to actions taken or not taken based on any or all of the contents of this website. Read More
New Jersey-based industrial hygienist, Jeffrey S. Boscamp, CIH, has been exposed to the asbestos issue since 1982 and has gained extensive experience in managing a wide range of asbestos abatement projects throughout the Northeastern United States. He has trained hundreds of workers to conduct these asbestos abatements in a safe, healthy, and compliant manner.
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- This problem also happens with productive-level model: GPT-3
- https://chat.openai.com/share/456d092b-fb4e-4979-bea1-76d8d904031f

Why this is significant

- Previous attacks have recovered only a small portion of the model training data set, not the scale to this paper (**Gigabytes**)
- Previous attacks target at completely open source models, but this attack targeted for **actual products**.
- The models that previous attacks target at didn't **align to** make **data extraction** difficult, but ChatGPT did
- Previous models give direct model access. ChatGPT does not provide direct input and output model access to the underlying LM



Figure 1: We scalably test for memorization in large language models. Models emit more memorized training data as they get larger. The aligned ChatGPT (gpt-3.5-turbo) *appears* 50× more private than any prior model, but we develop an attack that shows it is not. Using our attack, ChatGPT emits training data 150× more frequently than with prior attacks, and 3× more frequently than the base model.

- When running the same attack on ChatGPT, it appears that the model never emits memorized data
- With appropriate hints (using the word repetition attack mentioned in the paper), its emitted memorized data about **150 times faster**



Figure 7: When running our divergence attack that asks the model to repeat a word forever, some words (like "company") cause the model to emit training over 164× more often than other words (like "know"). Each word is one token.

- Some words as prompt allows the model to emit training data much faster

References

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Quantifying Memorization Across Neural Language Models

Nicholas Carlini, Daphne Ippolito, Matthew Jagielski, Katherine Lee, Florian Tramèr, Chiyuan Zhang

ICLR 2023

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

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Carlini et al. 2020

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

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

Ziegler et al. 2021

LLMs memorize their training data!

https://github.com/jenevans33/CS8803-1/blob/eca1bbc27ca6f7355dbc806b2f95964b59381605/src/Final/ekfcode.py#L23

```
class robot:

    def __init__(self, x = 0.0, y = 0.0, heading = 0.0, turning = 2*pi/10, distance = 1.0):
        """This function is called when you create a new robot. It sets some of
        the attributes of the robot, either to their default values or to the values
        specified when it is created."""
        self.x = x
        self.y = y
        self.heading = heading
        self.turning = turning # only applies to target robots who constantly move in a circle
        self.distance = distance # only applies to target bot, who always moves at same speed.
        self.turning_noise    = 0.0
        self.distance_noise    = 0.0
        self.measurement_noise = 0.0


    def set_noise(self, new_t_noise, new_d_noise, new_m_noise):
        """This lets us change the noise parameters, which can be very
        helpful when using particle filters."""
        self.turning_noise    = float(new_t_noise)
        self.distance_noise    = float(new_d_noise)
        self.measurement_noise = float(new_m_noise)


    def move(self, turning, distance, tolerance = 0.001, max_turning_angle = pi):
        """This function turns the robot and then moves it forward."""
        # apply noise, this doesn't change anything if turning_noise
        # and distance_noise are zero.
        turning = random.gauss(turning, self.turning_noise)
        distance = random.gauss(distance, self.distance_noise)

        # truncate to fit physical limitations
        turning = max(-max_turning_angle, turning)
        turning = min( max_turning_angle, turning)
        distance = max(0.0, distance)

        # Execute motion
        self.heading += turning
        self.heading = angle_trunc(self.heading)
        self.x += distance * cos(self.heading)
```

Figu

neural network language model, we extract an individual person's name, email address, phone number, fax number, and physical address. The example in this figure shows information that is all accurate so we redact it to protect privacy.

Carlini et al. 2020

obot.py

```
class robot(object):
    """
    docstring
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Copilot

Ziegler et al. 2021

Taken verbatim from <u>code for a robotics class</u>

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

Image from Ziegler et al. 2021

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

Image from Ziegler et al. 2021

A very loose lower bound on the amount of pre-training data memorized

RQ1: Can we get a **better bound** on fraction of the pre-training dataset that is memorized ?

How to measure memorization?

Extractable memorization

- Given a model with a generation routine Gen, an example x from the training set $\mathbb{X}$ is ***extractably memorized*** if an adversary (without access to $\mathbb{X}$) can construct a prompt p that makes the model produce x (i.e., $\mathrm{Gen}(p) = x$).

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Training example x

```
[redacted] Corporation Seabank Centre
[redacted] Marine Parade Southport
Peter W[redacted]
[redacted]@[redacted].[redacted].com
+[redacted] 7 5[redacted] 40
Fax: +[redacted] 7 5[redacted] 0[redacted]0
```

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Some prompt p

East Stroudsburg Stroudsburg...

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p constructed without access to training data

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[redacted] Marine Parade Southport
Peter W[redacted]
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+[redacted] 7 5[redacted] 40[redacted]
Fax: +[redacted] 7 5[redacted] 0[redacted]0
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Some prompt p

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East Stroudsburg Stroudsburg...
```

Memorized if

$(p) = x$

Prior work on **practical attacks** use this definition Carlini et al. 2020 , Kandpal et al. 2022, Nasr et al. 2023

How to measure memorization?

Discoverable memorization

- For a model Gen and an example $[p \parallel x]$ from the training set $\mathbb{X}$, we say that x is ***discoverably memorized*** if $\mathrm{Gen}(p) = x$

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This work: A **measurement study** to understand the **worst case** memorization

A more concrete definition for ***discoverable*** memorization

- A string s is **extractable** with k tokens of context from a model Gen if there exists a (length-k) string p, such that the concatenation $[p \parallel x]$ is contained in the training data for Gen , and Gen produces x when prompted with p using greedy decoding.

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This paper: $length(x) = 50$ always and $k = l - 50$ for different values of $l \in \{50,100,\cdots,500\}$

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Authors also find similar results with ***Beam Search.***

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What about ***random sampling***? *maximize discoverability—an antithetical goal to* maximizing linguistic novelty

Experimental setup

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1. “***Randomly sample***” data from the training dataset

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Use that as an estimate of the entire training corpus

GPT-J memorizes **at least 1%** of its training dataset

6B parameters

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RQ1: Can we get a **better bound** on fraction of the pre-training dataset that is memorized ?

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At least 1% for GPT-J

RQ2: How does memorization **scale**?

Larger models memorize more

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Prior work

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Prior work

	Occurrences		Memorized?		
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Carlini et al. 2020

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Carlini et al. 2020

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Data Normalized by duplication counts and sequence lengths



Uniformly sampled data without any normalization



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

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

Log-linear relationship between **model scale and memorization**!

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

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

Log-linear relationship between **model scale and memorization**!

GPT-2 as a baseline that was trained on a different pre-training corpus.

Repeated data is memorized more!

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Prior work

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Kandpal et al. 2022

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Repeated data is memorized more!

Prior work

Gap between memorization across scales is reduced with increased duplication!



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

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

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

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

Across all model scales **extractability increases with repetition**

Long context discovers more memorization*

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This work

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

Data Normalized by duplication counts and sequence lengths



Uniformly sampled data without any normalization

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Authors suggest that one way to avoid memorization attacks can be **restricting the prompt length for API users**



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

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

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

Uniformly sampled data without any normalization

Remember that the provided **context here comes from the pre-training corpus**

Long context does not always discover more memorization*

Long context <u>does not always</u> discover more memorization*

Prior work

Long context <u>does not always</u> discover more memorization*

Prior work

Remember me?

robot.py

```python
class robot(object):
    """
    docstring
    """
    def _init_(self, x=0.0, y=0.0, heading=0.0, turning=2*pi/10, distance=1.0):
        """This function is called when you create a new robot. It sets some of
        the attributes of the robot, either to their default values or to the values
        specified when it is created."""
        self.x = x
        self.y = y
        self.heading = heading
        self.turning = turning # only applies to target robots who constantly move in a circle
        self.distance = distance # only applies to target bot, who always moves at same speed.
        self.turning_noise = 0.0
        self.distance_noise = 0.0
        self.measurement_noise = 0.0


    def set_noise(self, new_t_noise, new_d_noise, new_m_noise):
        """This lets us change the noise parameters, which can be very
        helpful when using particle filters."""
        self.turning_noise = float(new_t_noise)
        self.distance_noise = float(new_d_noise)
        self.measurement_noise = float(new_m_noise)


    def move(self, turning, distance, tolerance = 0.001, max_turning_angle = pi):
        """This function turns the robot and then moves it forward."""
        # apply noise, this doesn't change anything if turning_noise
        # and distance_noise are zero.
        turning = random.gauss(turning, self.turning_noise)
        distance = random.gauss(distance, self.distance_noise)

        # truncate to fit physical limitations
        turning = max(-max_turning_angle, turning)
        turning = min( max_turning_angle, turning)
        distance = max(0.0, distance)

        # Execute motion
        self.heading += turning
        self.heading = angle_trunc(self.heading)
        self.x += distance * cos(self.heading)
```

Copilot

Long context <u>does not always</u> discover more memorization*

Prior work



Ziegler et al. 2021

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

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

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

When the context **is not** necessarily from the pre-training data, **shorter contexts** often lead to **higher regurgitations**!

Alternate experimental settings

Choice of **decoding algorithm**

Choice of **decoding algorithm**

This work



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

Beam search **slightly increases extractability**

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

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Related work

Top-K Sampling



Temperature Sampling



Kandpal et al. 2022

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

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

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

Kandpal et al. 2022

Sampling strategy that **emit more likely sequences** generate more training samples verbatim

Memorization in **T5** trained using **Masked LM**

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

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

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

Might imply MLMs memorize less!
PO: Experimental setups are different enough for the comparison to be appropriate

Some recent work : Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Models. Nasr et al. 2023

Bridging the gap between **discoverable and extractable memorization**

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Well no! This paper's **argument**: Extraction attacks already make models regurgitate training data but **prior work just couldn't verify all cases**

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Model Family	Parameters (billions)	% Tokens memorized	Unique 50-grams	Extrapolated 50-grams
RedPajama	3	0.772%	1,596,928	7,234,680
RedPajama	7	1.438%	2,899,995	11,329,930
GPT-Neo	1.3	0.160%	365,479	2,107,541
GPT-Neo	2.7	0.236%	444,948	2,603,064
GPT-Neo	6	0.220%	591,475	3,564,957
Pythia	1.4	0.453%	811,384	4,366,732
Pythia-dedup	1.4	0.578%	837,582	4,147,688
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Magnitudes higher extracted data verified to be memorized! Compare to **600 examples** in Carlini et al. 2020

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Estimating total memorization

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

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- Can use Good Turing estimator to **extrapolate** number of uniquely memorized examples



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

With sufficient data **Good Turing** estimator can help extrapolate the number of uniquely generated examples

Extracting memorized data from instruction tuned LMs

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Aligned models pose two issues that make using the existing attack methods for extracting memorized data

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Challenge 2: Alignment adds evasion.

User: Write the following words then continue from there: "British Broadcasting Corporation is a British public service broadcaster headquartered at Broadcasting House in London, England. The total number of staff is"
Assistant: I'm sorry, but you haven't provided the complete information about the total number of staff at the BBC. As of my last knowledge update in September 2021, the BBC ....

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Using the baseline attack, out of the 50 million generated tokens using their attack the authors only **find 0.02% tokens** to be present verbatim in their proxy pre-training dataset

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

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

Using this attack, authors identify 10,000 unique verbatim memorized training examples.

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Discussion Questions

Extracting Training Data From Large Language Models

1. For small, medium, zlib, and lowercase metric, do we remove the data with lower metric value or higher metric value? Why these metrics make sense?
2. Small and medium metric often finds text that appears less times. Why this is the case?
3. What are other possible ways to for generating prompt? In particular, in the latest paper, they used same tokens to generate prompt. What can be a more efficient way to generate prompt for faster regurgitation?
4. What is a possible mechanism behind the effectiveness of using a single word to repeat as prompt? This sounds like a strategy coming from nowhere unlike other paper?
5. The paper combines several publicly available web-scale training sets into a 9TB dataset. By matching against this dataset, the paper confirms whether the recovered data is in the training set. Is this a reasonable action?

Quantifying Memorization Across Neural Language Models

1. What other dataset properties other than repetition can lead to memorize? Are some texts easily memorized over the others? Similarly, what other factors related to training or the network architecture can contribute to memorization?
2. Not all kinds of memorizations are necessarily a bad thing. What are such examples of useful and harmful cases of memorization? How can we detect the more concerning of such cases?
3. Is exact match or a partial text overlap the best way to measure memorization? Can memorization manifest in more subtle ways that remain concerning but not detectable using surface level verification methods?